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31 Aug 1978, DoDD 5200.10; AGO D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980	

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LESSONED LEARNED HEADQUARTERS, 2D HOWITZER BATTALION, 13TH ARTILLERY

11 Aug 66

AVGE-WC

SUBJECT: Operational Report for [REDACTED] Period Ending 31 Jul 66, [REDACTED]
Control Symbol (AFOR-65) (U)

THRU:

Commanding Officer
23d Artillery Group
ATTN: AVGE-C
APO 96289

18 OACSFOR

19 OT-RD-660126

Commanding General
II Field Force Vietnam Artillery
ATTN: AVX-FA-C
APO 96227

Commanding General
United States Army Vietnam
ATTN: AVC-DH
APO 96307

Commander-in-Chief
United States Army Pacific
ATTN: GPOP-MH
APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

SECTION I

1. (C) Significant Organization or Unit Activities

FOR OTRD

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SUBJECT: Operational Report For Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966

a. Administration/Personnel

(1) Administration: Since the last reporting period the following awards and decorations have been presented to members of this command.

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>
Bronze Star (Valor)	5
Bronze Star	4
Army Commendation Medal (Valor)	6
Army Commendation Medal	7
Air Medal	5
Purple Heart	1
Legion of Merit	1

(2) Personnel: Currently this unit is 13% overstrength. It is capable of performing all assigned missions. Since the last reporting period there has been a 4% turnover in personnel. However, those newly assigned have been rapidly integrated into the unit.

b. Intelligence

(1) Battalion air observers flew over 190 observation and reconnaissance missions during the reporting period. Missions were flown in support of operations Birmingham, El Paso II, Fireball I and Adelaid/Rolling Force, Cedar Rapids II and for the night aerial surveillance of the Phu Loi and Di An complexes.

(2) A total of 6 combat and reconnaissance patrols were mounted with negative enemy contact.

c. Training

(1) To insure that replacements arriving in this unit receive adequate refresher and familiarization training, this battalion conducts a 40 hour block of instruction semi-annually. New arrivals are also briefed on unit mission, local situation, and escape and evasion. In addition, each individual arriving in this unit is given an opportunity to test fire and check the battle sight zero of his assigned weapon.

(2) Emphasis is being placed on proficiency training. Batteries are conducting cannoneer drill to reduce reaction times and increase accuracy of fires. Fire direction personnel are given team drill exercises to increase proficiency of personnel assigned.

d. Operations

(1) Operation Birmingham. This operation was conducted in the

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Tay Ninh area from 24 April to 16 May 1966. During the period 24 April to 10 May 1966, Battery B was attached to 1st How Bn, 5th Arty. During the period 10 May to 16 May 1966, Battery B was attached to Hq, 1st Inf Div Arty and assigned the mission of General Support of the Support Command, 1st Inf Div. Battery B sustained two casualties (WIA) as a result of hostile action. No direct enemy attacks were initiated against the battery positions. The 2/13 Liaison Section and three forward observer parties were attached to 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry for the duration of Operation Birmingham. The FO parties were further attached, one each, to subordinate troops.

(2) Operation Lam Son II. This battalion has had from one to two batteries in direct support in the local pacification program. This operation was initiated on 22 May 1966, and at present is continuing.

(3) Operation El Paso II. On 6 June 1966, Battery C was alerted to move to Loc Ninh. The battery departed 6 June 1966, by C-123 aircraft and was attached to the 2/33 Arty upon arrival at Loc Ninh. On 9 June 1966, Battery A and Headquarters Battery(-) departed Phu Loi for Chon Thanh by CH-47 aircraft. Upon arrival in the field position the battalion assumed the mission of direct support 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division. Battery C, 2/33 Arty located at Minh Thanh was attached to 2/13 Arty on 9 June 1966. Liaison was established with 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division upon arrival in the 1st Brigade FSCC throughout the operation. On 10 June 1966, Battery D, 8/6 Arty closed in field position at Chon Thanh and was attached to 2/13 Arty. On 15 June 1966, Battery D, 1/5 Arty arrived in field position vic coord XT753543 and was attached to 2/13 Arty. Battery D, 1/5 Arty remained attached to 2/13 Arty until 15 June 1966, at which time the battery closed in position at Lai Khe and was detached from 2/13 Arty. The 2/13 Arty was relieved of its mission of direct support 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division on 28 June 1966. On 18 June 1966, Hqs(-) 8/6 Arty closed in position at Chon Thanh. Battery D, 8/6 was detached from 2/13 Arty upon arrival of parent unit. On 20 June 1966, Battery D, 1/5 Arty closed in field position at Dau Tieng and was reattached to 2/13 Arty. On 28 June 1966, Hqs Btry(-) and Btry A returned to Phu Loi. Btry C, 2/13 Arty remained attached to 2/33 Arty until 16 July 1966, at which time they returned to Phu Loi base camp.

(4) On 17 July 1966, Battery A was attached to 1/5 Arty, direct support to 1/26 Infantry on Operation Cedar Rapids II. Battery A was relieved from attached to 1/5 Arty on 24 July 1966, and returned to Phu Loi.

(5) Battery B was attached to the 1/5 Arty on 22 July 1966, direct support to 1/26 Infantry. Battery B was relieved from attached to the 1/5 Arty on 24 July 1966.

(6) Number of missions and ammunition expended during the reporting period.

NUMBER OF MISSIONS
5189

105mm AMMO EXPENDED
39635

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e. Logistics

(1) Logistics for the period of this report consisted primarily of support of the battalion and attached units on Operation El Paso II. Supply, maintenance, ammunition, and mess personnel operated from the Division Logistical Base at Lai Khe after movement by C-123 aircraft of personnel and equipment from Phu Loi.

(2) A total of six-hundred (600) personnel were supported over a two-week period.

(3) Two 1.-ration meals daily were prepared at log base and transported in insulated food containers by aircraft to field locations.

(4) At start of operation, three 105mm batteries, one 8" battery, one armored cavalry platoon, and a headquarters element were supported. At one time an infantry company was also supported with rations.

(5) 105 How, 8" How, and 105mm gun ammunition was supplied from Lai Khe by aerial means. HU-1D aircraft were utilized for resupply of tank and small arms ammunition while CH-47's were utilized for daily resupply of 105mm How and 8" How ammo. Batteries located by airstrips were resupplied daily by C-123 aircraft. CV-2 aircraft were utilized in some instances for resupply to airstrip locations after programmed ammo had been delivered and need arose for additional ammunition.

(6) A-22 cargo containers were utilized for the first time in this battalion for external loading of ammunition. 105mm How rounds were transported in fiber containers. This allowed for 160 rounds (80 rds per A-22 container) to be transported with each CH-47 sortie and eliminated accumulation of additional debris in isolated locations which would have to be destroyed or lifted out upon departure. Thirty-eight (38) 8" projectiles were transported with each sortie, also utilizing A-22 cargo containers. It was determined to be impractical to transport 8" powder containers externally due to their configuration which does not allow for maximum weight capacity in an external netted configuration.

(7) Upon delivery of ammunition by CH-47 external load, residue, such as powder cannisters, was picked up by the aircraft, also externally, and backhauled to log base. This allowed maximum utilization and benefit of aircraft, and also kept isolated locations "clean" allowing for a minimum of sorties upon movement of unit.

(8) All available ammunition was prepared in external load configuration which enhanced speedy delivery. The only time aircraft had to land was for refueling purposes.

(9) Repair parts and other II and IV items were obtained from Phu

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Loi when not available through supply sources at Lai Khe. These were flown to log element by 23d Artillery Group aircraft.

(10) Routine resupply sorties, i.e, rations, water, and small parts were made by HU-1D aircraft with battalion supply representatives on board to insure proper delivery of supplies.

(11) Replacement 2½ ton trucks, M35A2, were received for the twenty-four (24) M-211 trucks previously turned in for salvage by this battalion.

(12) This battalion has received no issue of poncho liners as yet. Requisitions on items date back to October 1965. Number of most recent requisition submitted is 6148-019 dated 28 May 1966.

(13) Lamps, 28V, have not been obtained through issue or self-service channels. This lamp is extremely important for emergency lighting of fire direction centers in conjunction with 0.5KW, 28V generator.

(14) Personnel arriving from CONUS have not been reporting with required TA50-901, primarily inflatable pad and blanket. Also, upon inspection, footwear of new arrivals has been found to be in poor condition or unservicable.

f. Aviation

(1) The organic aircraft of the battalion flew the following.

<u>Type Aircraft</u>	<u>Hours</u>	<u>Missions</u>	<u>Sorties</u>
OH-13	119	129	561
O-1D(2)	316	230	435
Totals	435	359	996

(2) During the reporting period, aviation support for the battalion was flown by assigned aviators but in borrowed aircraft. Total pilot time is as follows.

<u>Type Aircraft</u>	<u>Hours</u>	<u>Missions</u>	<u>Sorties</u>
OH-13	148	265	505
O-1D	435	250	302
Totals	583	515	807

g. Civic Action

(1) Battalion provided a survey team to survey streets and home sites in the village of Gadsden, Vietnam.

(2) Battalion medical section conducted MEDCAP while participating

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in Operation Lam Son II. On three different occasions the medical section treated approximately 1800 local Vietnamese in the Phu Loi area.

SECTION 2

1. (C) Observations (Lessons Learned)

a. Personnel: Morale in this unit is extremely high due to various factors. The men of this unit are keenly aware of their duties and are confident of their abilities to perform them. Daily they improve themselves and their living conditions. The effect of the R&R program has been a positive one.

b. Operations

(1) Throughout the reporting period all aircraft, two O-1D's and one OH-13, were utilized on two major combat operations, Operation Birmingham and El Paso II, and within the area of operations at Phu Loi, Vietnam.

(2) On El Paso II, a battalion effort, all available aircraft were required daily. The O-1D fixed wing aircraft flew visual reconnaissance, artillery adjustment, convoy cover, radio relay, message drop, and position fixing missions for the supported units; while the OH-13, though it flew many of the same missions as the O-1D's, was primarily used for command and control of the widely separated batteries. The OH-13 was able to live in the field with the battalion headquarters, but the O-1D's were based at the home airfield, 15 minutes away, where maintenance and fuel were more readily available. Communications for control proved to be no problem.

(3) During the periods of activity in the field, daily support requirements for additional Class I supplies, passenger transportation, repair parts, and mail existed, and they were met with the use of the U-6 (Beaver) belonging to the 23d Artillery Group. One limitation in utilization of the U-6 was that it could provide service only to an established airfield, and often excessive delays resulted for units receiving the support. A more efficient system of support could be arranged if the deliveries of supplies were made to the requiring unit at its field position.

(4) For the balance of the reporting period where support was not required for units in the field, battalion aircraft flew day and night visual reconnaissance, artillery registrations, and support for Operation Lam Son II in the Phu Loi area of operation.

(5) Loading CH-47 aircraft.

(a) Item: External sling loading of CH-47 aircraft.

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(b) Discussion: External sling loading of howitzers and ammunition provides for rapid movement from one LZ to another. When CH-47 are loaded internally in most cases howitzer ammunition and section equipment must be loaded by hand. This is time consuming and impractical in rough terrain. In external sling loading, loads can be rigged in place prior to aircraft arriving, cutting down considerably on aircraft time and reaction time.

(c) Observation: That external sling loading during operations into unimproved landing zones in cases where time is important is much more practical than internal loading except when the use of external sling loads are precluded due to reasons of security.

(6) Communications over long distances.

(a) Item: Communication over extended distances.

(b) Discussion: Communications over long distances requires a more efficient antenna than the RC-292 antenna.

(c) Observation: A 60 foot mast antenna used by the 1st Bde, 1st Inf Div has produced very satisfactory results.

(7) Navigational aid: WP fired with time fuze and with a 300 meter height of burst provides an excellent navigational aid.

c. Training and Organization

(1) Augmentation of fire direction centers.

(a) Item: Augmentation of battery and battalion fire direction centers.

(b) Discussion: Due to the increased gunnery problem caused by providing a 6400m capability and having the firing battery laid on several azimuths of fire there is undue hardship and strain on the presently assigned personnel as authorized by TOE.

(c) Observation: It is felt that the battery and battalion fire direction centers would greatly increase their efficiency if two computers were augmented.

d. Intelligence

(1) Air observers.

(a) Item: Use of qualified air observers.

(b) Discussion: Over 90% of the observed missions fired

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have been adjusted by aerial observers.


(c) Observation: The use of qualified aerial observers increases the effect of artillery fires.

2. (C) Recommendations

a. Large color panels rather than smoke grenades should be used to mark howitzer and ground positions in landing zones to preclude the temporary blinding of pilots and grass or brush fires.

b. Packaging of 105 howitzer ammunition in steel "jungle pack" containers should cease. Normal packaging in wooden containers allows for safe and protected storage from weather. Steel containers also cause disposal problems.

c. Company grade officers should be given a thorough orientation on aerial observer procedure prior to arrival in Vietnam.


G. E. ROBINSON
Lt Col, Arty
Commanding

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AVGE-C (10 Aug 66)

1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report For Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966,
Reports Control Symbol CSFOR-65 (U)

HEADQUARTERS, 23D ARTILLERY GROUP, APO 96289, US Forces, 13 August 1966

TO: Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam Artillery, APO US Forces 96227


1. (U) The quarterly report submitted by the 2nd Battalion, 13th Artillery is adequate.

2. (U) Ref Section II, para 2a. Color panels are not plausible for a fast moving tactical situation.

3. (U) Ref Section II, para 2b. If steel containers are collected and used over again then they have an advantage over the wooden boxes. If they are not, then the wood from non-recoverable wooden containers may be used to build shelters and improve battery positions.

4. (U) Ref Section II, para 2c. Concur. The substance of this recommendation has already been submitted in a previous command report of this Headquarters.

5. (U) This page regraded UNCLASSIFIED when separated from basic document.


THOMAS H. SAYES
Colonel, Artillery
Commanding

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AVFB-FAC (10 Aug 66)

2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966,
RCS-CSFOR - 65 (U)

DA, HQ, II FFORCEV Arty, APO 96266 AUG 29 1966

TO: Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam, APO 96266

1. (U) The Operational Report for the quarterly period 1 May - 31 July 1966 submitted by the 2d How Bn, 13th Arty adequately covers all aspects of the battalion's operations during the quarterly period.

2. (U) The following comments are made on the problem areas/recommendations discussed in the report:

a. Ref para 1e(12), page 5. The lack of poncho liners is prevalent in all units; however, this does not present a serious problem.

b. Ref para 1e(13), page 5. This item should be carried in the PLL for the unit's lighting set. The battalion will be requested to submit more information concerning the actions taken to obtain 28V lamps so that this headquarters can appropriately follow up on the requisitions.

c. Ref para 1e(14), page 5. The unit has been informed that message, AVD-SP 13425, USARV, DTG 280610Z May 66, subj: Equipment for Replacements (U) stated that individuals will not bring TA 50-901 with them and that units will issue these items to individuals when they arrive. The problem of unservicable footwear should be brought to the attention of CONUS commanders.

d. Ref Section 2, para 1e(1), page 7. The battalion will be instructed to submit an MTOE.

e. Ref Section 2, para 2a, page 8. No action is required by this or higher headquarters on this recommendation. The marking of landing zones is a matter of SOP and should be worked out between supported and supporting units. A problem which can occur when panels are used to mark landing zones is that the panels can be sucked up into the rotor blades of the helicopters if not properly staked down.

f. Ref Section 2, paragraph 2b, page 8. Concur. The weight of the metal container limits the amount of ammunition that can be carried by helicopters and airlift aircraft.

g. Ref Section 2, paragraph 2c, page 8. Concur. This headquarters understands that the United States Army Artillery and Missile School is now teaching aerial observation to Basic Course students.

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George R. Allin, Jr.
GEORGE R. ALLIN, Jr.
Colonel, Artillery
Acting Commander

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AVFBC-H (10 Aug 66) 3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July
1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

DA, HQ II Field Force Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96266 20 SEP 1966


THRU: Commanding General, USARV, ATTN: AVC-Dh, APO 96307

Commander in Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-MH, APO 96588

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Dept of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

(U) The Operational Report for Period Ending 31 July 1966
submitted by the 2d Howitzer Battalion, 13th Artillery, as in-
dorsed, is considered adequate.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


ROBERT L. ALDERMAN
Major, AGC
Asst AG

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AVHGC-DH (10 Aug 66) 4th Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 July 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96307 20 NOV 1966

TC: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT
APO 96558

1. The Operational Report-Lessons Learned submitted by the 2d Battalion, 13th Artillery for the quarter ending 31 July 1966 is forwarded herewith.

2. Concur with the comments contained in the basic report and the previous indorsements.

3. Reference Section II, Paragraph 2b, Page 8, 1st Indorsement, Paragraph 3 and 2d Indorsement, Paragraph 2f: The wooden box and fiber container provide protection when exposed to outside uncovered storage in climatic conditions such as RVN for periods of 8 to 14 months. The metal container (jungle pack) provides protection under similar conditions for a much longer time frame. While the weight factor and disposal problem with the metal container is recognized the serviceability of reserve stocks must be given consideration. The assorted packaging (wood boxes and metal containers) offers a choice to the user. The unit will be informed that if the jungle pack is not desired, the issue request should specify a specific pack using the complete Federal Stock Number (FSN) and Department of Defense Identification Code (DODIC).

FOR THE COMMANDER:


E. J. THORNTON
1st Lt, AGC
Asst Adjutant General

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GPOP-OT(10 Aug 66)

5th Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 July 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 9 DEC1966

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in the basic report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

G. L. McMullin
G. L. McMULLIN
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

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